Dei'ah veDibur - Information & Insight
  

A Window into the Chareidi World

6 Ellul 5763 - September 3, 2003 | Mordecai Plaut, director Published Weekly
NEWS

OPINION
& COMMENT

OBSERVATIONS

HOME
& FAMILY

IN-DEPTH
FEATURES

VAAD HORABBONIM HAOLAMI LEINYONEI GIYUR

TOPICS IN THE NEWS

HOMEPAGE

 

Produced and housed by
Shema Yisrael Torah Network
Shema Yisrael Torah Network

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NEWS
Or Report: Barak Escapes; Ben-Ami Censured; Police Officials Banned
by Yated Ne'eman Staff

The Or Judicial Commission of Inquiry released its long- awaited report on the October 2000 riots in the Israeli Arab sector Monday, passing blame all around, including the police, top government officials, and Israeli Arab leaders, for the bloodshed. Twelve Israeli Arabs and a Palestinian were shot and killed by police. A Jewish motorist was killed in a crash after his car was stoned. All this took place during the first eight days of October 2000 at the beginning of the outbreak of Palestinian violence that has now continued for three years.

On November 15, 2000, almost six week after the events, Prime Minister Barak bowed to political pressure and established a judicial commission of inquiry. The members included Supreme Court Justice Theodore Or, Tel Aviv University Prof. Shimon Shamir, and Nazareth District Court Judge Hashem Khatib. The final 860-page report was endorsed by all three.

The report said that prime minister Ehud Barak was not aware of the mood in the Arab community, as he should have been, and ignored advice to hold a discussion about its needs. It said that his failings were serious but that it decided not to consider whether they disqualified him from holding public office. The commission thus did not recommend barring him from public office in the future, and this is seen as a green light to return to politics. Barak has recently indicated that he wants to do so.

The report criticized former internal security minister Shlomo Ben-Ami for failing to prepare the police and for an inadequate response, and recommended that he not be allowed to hold that portfolio in the future. Ben-Ami, a historian who came to politics from Tel Aviv University, had already quit politics. Ben-Ami said in response that he had acted properly.

The commission singled out the then-police commissioner Yehuda Wilk, and the commander of the police's northern district Alec Ron, as being unsuitable for the posts they held. The commission recommended that Wilk not be allowed to hold positions involving internal security and that Ron be barred from holding any operational or administrative position involving internal security. Both have retired from work in Israel police.

The commission recommended that one senior police officer and one junior police officer be discharged from service. Only one officer of those warned during the commission's inquiry was totally cleared. The commission also recommended a criminal investigation of all the fatal shootings.

It also held MKs Abdel Malik Dahamshe and Azmi Bishara and the leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement, Sheikh Raed Salah and then major of Umm el-Fahm, responsible for inflaming the Arab sector.

Dahamshe and Bishara advocated the use of violence, while Salah rejected the legitimacy of Israel, the commission asserted. The commission left it to the public to decide whether or not they should be punished. Salah is currently under arrest, accused of supporting Hamas financially.

The commission devoted much space in its report to recommendations about the police. It wrote that there were serious flaws in the way the police conducted internal investigations of incidents and the way policemen wrote out reports of the incidents in which they were involved. "It appears that the police have not internalized the culture of making full reports and conducting investigations in real time," wrote the commission.

The report has six parts. The first is a study of the underlying causes of the events of October 1-8, 2000, including the radicalization of the Arab community, the discrimination it has suffered, the escalation and increasing violence of its protests, and the lack of preparedness of the police for the disturbances that erupted. The second and third chapters are studies of the day-by-day events from October 1 to October 10, and a close look at specific incidents. The fourth chapter deals with special issues, including the police use of rubber-coated bullets and snipers.

The commission wrote that the type of rubber-coated bullets used by the police during the riots, which included three pellets in each cartridge, should be stopped altogether. Regular rubber bullets should be used only in life- threatening situations. It also wrote that the use of snipers in all three cases (once in Umm el-Fahm, twice in Nazareth) was unjustified.

The commission also gave special attention to the role of Bishara, Dahamshe, and Salah in inflaming passions. The commission rejected the claims of the Arab leadership to the effect that the Arab community did nothing more than demonstrate and speak out and, as such, merely exercised its democratic rights.

"The force of the aggressiveness and violence that came to the fore during these events was extremely high. [The demonstrators] used various means of assault against civilians and security personnel, including firebombs, steel marbles, rocks, burning tires, and in some cases live bullets. Jews were attacked on the roads just because they were Jews. In several cases, they were a hair's breadth away from death at the hands of a rioting mob," said the report.

But the commission added that the violence would not stop unless the government begins to treat the Arabs fairly.

Police and security officials have learned from past mistakes and will continue to work towards coexistence between Israeli Arabs and Jews, according to current Israel Police Insp.-Gen. Shlomo Aharonishky in his initial response to the Or Commission report. "There is no doubt that the events of October 2000 were in scope and results unprecedented and tragic for everyone involved," he said.

Israeli Arab leaders held a press conference in Jerusalem to express the community's anger at the report's limited direction and conclusions.

Speakers said they were disappointed that the report charged a number of their leaders with incitement and failed to charge the individuals who killed the 13 Arabs. They also said they will continue to seek justice through the Israeli legal system and even the international courts.

Officials of the Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel said they intended to appeal to Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein to immediately start legal proceedings against policemen involved in the killing of 12 Israeli Arabs and a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip during the riots.

Shawki Khatib, head of the Monitoring Committee of Arab Israeli Leadership, said the question of who killed the 13 people is crucial, while the question of incitement by Israeli-Arab leaders is beside the point.

"In my opinion, what needed to be investigated was why Israeli Arabs rioted in such numbers and collaborated with the Palestinians and, as a result, Jews were killed or wounded," said Dr. Reuven Jan, son of the Israeli killed in the riots when his car was stoned.

Jan said that his father and uncle were returning home after visiting a sick relative in the North when the rocks were thrown at their car. Jan said, "My father was the only person to be actually murdered. The others [the Arabs] were killed because they were rioting."

 

All material on this site is copyrighted and its use is restricted.
Click here for conditions of use.