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Jewish Blood for Jewish Money: The Story of 'The Europe Plan'
By Sammy Kaufman
Rav Michoel Dov Weissmandl zt"l
For Part I of this series click here.
For Part III of this series click here.
This was originally published in 1995.
Part 2
In the first part we saw how he plan was conceived by Rav Weissmandl and the correspondence with Jewish leaders to try to secure financial resources to save Jews, with no success.
Rav Weissmandl's and Mrs. Fleischmann's letters reached Eretz Yisroel. "Part of Schwalb's letters, together with Weissmandl's letters which are addressed to Moshe Sharett and the leaders of the yishuv, are preserved in the Zionist Archive (File S261444.) Today it is clear that the letters arrived at their destination." (Tamar Meroz and Reuven Pedatzur, The Deal That Never Was, Ha'aretz, April 29, 1984)
Slovakia
Professor Dinah Porat writes, "Letters from Slovakia (about The Europe Plan) reached Geneva and Constantinople at the end of 1942. The leadership in Eretz Yisroel was aware of their contents by mid-Januray 1943, and also of a detailed report from Schwalb, which was accompanied by his view that the proposal should be taken up." (D. Porat, Leadership Ensnared)
David Remez, in a meeting of the Directorship of the Vaad Haleumi, on the seventeenth of January, Dr. Rofeisen, in a meeting of the Zionist Executive Committee on the eighteenth of January, Neustadt and others, demanded an immediate clarification of the plan's details from the Agency's Directorship and from the Rescue Committee. On the twenty fifth of January, Neustadt received a letter from Dubkin, in the name of the Agency's leadership which said, "Regarding Slovakia, a telegram has been sent to Silberschein [in] Geneva in which we gave notice of our agreement in principle to the plan and asked for several realistic proposals to be looked into as well as for the amount that would be required from us for the purpose." Silberschein was asked to forward this decision to Slovakia immediately." (ibid. S. Bet Tzvi cites a telegram to this effect from Gruenbaum to Silberschein, which is preserved in the Yad Vashem Archive. This is presumably the telegram to which Porat refers.)
This is how Schwalb ends his letter to Kaplan, in which he set out the reasons why he felt the plan deserved a favorable response, "We must therefore concentrate on this great matter and gather the maximum means for it. If it works out, we will have saved so and so much life." (Porat ibid. quoted according to C. Terek-Yablonka, The Europe Plan)
Was the interest displayed by these leaders genuine? Were they prepared to do their utmost for the sake of rescuing the three million Jews who remained trapped?
Rav Weissmandl had asked rhetorically in a letter he wrote on the first of December, 1942, "Is there a man in the world who doesn't understand that money is worthless when compared to human life?" (Min Hameitzar) Unfortunately, the answer was not as straightforward as it ought to have been.
The Jewish Agency Building in Jerusalem in the 1940s
Voices of Dissent
At a meeting of the Zionist Executive Committee on the eighteenth of January, Yitzhak Gruenbaum said, "In the meantime, a new mood has begun to hold sway in Eretz Yisrael, which I think is very dangerous for the Zionist cause... I do not understand... how is it that in Yerushalayim people call to me, 'If you don't have enough money, take money from Keren Hayesod, take it from the bank, there's money there...' I feel it my duty to stand firm before this barrage... I said 'No,' and I say it again, 'No.' I know that people wonder at me. Why do I feel that this must be said? Friends counsel me that even if it is the case, it should not be stated in public... I cannot agree with them. In my opinion, the onslaught which relegates Zionist activities to secondary importance must be resisted. Of course there will be enough money if we take it from Keren Hayesod, but we won't take it from there. We will continue to use that money for the Battle for our Redemption."
'The Battle for our Redemption' means, in other words, activities that build the Zionist dream. Gruenbaum spelled out the fundamentals of this belief in the concluding sentences of his speech, "Zionism above all else! This call must be sounded every time a great holocaust diverts us from the path of our redemption in Zion. Especially in times like these, we must, in my opinion, guard the primacy of the Battle for Redemption." (S. Bet Tzvi)
In the course of the same meeting, Gruenbaum described an argument he had had with Rav Yitzchok Meir Levin of Agudas Yisroel, whose suggestion for obtaining the money Gruenbaum had so emphatically dismissed. In support of his position, Gruenbaum had said, "If Jews in Warsaw were to be asked about the order of financial priorities, they would say, 'If they are successful in Eretz Yisroel, well and good. But if not, and we do manage to save whatever we can in Europe, then the sort of lives for which they will have been saved, will be undescribable.' " (Barzel, from C.Z.A.)
Both Dubkin and Kaplan made known their view that aid for Diaspora Jewry ought not to come from the coffers of Keren Hayesod or Keren Kayemet. (ibid. Keren Hayesod's income in 1940 was six hundred and twenty three thousand liras while that of Keren Hakayemet's was six hundred and eight thousand liras. These figures are from Ba'maaleh, Dec.25 1940.)
It was not only Gruenbaum, Dubkin and Kaplan who felt this way. "As to the fundamental question of whether 'the Battle for Redemption' was to take precedence over rescue work, there are plenty of proofs that despite the verbal opposition which some of Gruenbaum's colleagues expressed, he had articulated what they truly felt, in their heart of hearts. What was even more significant was how he guided their actions." (S. Bet Tzvi)
Speaking in memory of Yitzhak Gruenbaum on the twenty third of December, 1979, Moshe Kol said, "He was one of the trailblazers of Jewish independence and the foundation layers of the Jewish State. He truly represented Judaism and Zionism with his pure character, [he was] a pedagogue, who could serve as an example for the general public. Today, when the State of Israel is wracked by severe internal problems and religious anti-Zionist groups cast their shadow over our lives and over our Government, it is good to examine Gruenbaum's writings. His towering and riveting personality ought to be evoked for all to see and should serve as the basis for the education of the young generation."
Dr. A. Fuchs: "Gruenbaum refused to help the Jews in Poland, for the Agency's funds would not have benefited from it."
S. Bet Tzvi: "Gruenbaum retained his position at the head of the Rescue Committee, [even] after his negative programs had become apparent."
Na'ima Barzel sums up the Executive Committee's meeting on the eighteenth of January, "In the meeting, the distinction was drawn between 'rescue,' which in fact meant aliya to Eretz Yisrael, as opposed to financial assistance. Rescue through aliya was explicitly defined as one of the functions of the Jewish Agency, while [as for] monetary help, [the message was,] 'The yishuv cannot afford it.' "
A railcar used by the Nazis to transport Jews
A Heartfelt Appeal
On the twenty-sixth of April 1987, Al Hamishmar published an interview with Dr. Yigal Eilam by Ronit Morgenstern, under the title, The Ideal—Building the Land is More Important.
Dr. Eilam stated, "It was a practical question... we needed to siphon off manpower and money and this would have been at the expense of building the Land... It reached the stage where we fought the welfare organizations in the West, like the Joint, which wanted to aid the Jews who were suffering in Eastern Europe. We fought them over that money and drew off half of it for Eretz Yisrael... Money is one of the crucial tests...
In the meeting of the Mapai Central Committee on the tenth of February 1943, Y. Haft, who, in November 1942 had been placed in charge of fundraising for rescue work, complained of 'a fatal misunderstanding.' Bader would sit and reckon out amounts in hundreds of thousands of liras, then Gruenbaum would come and say that fifteen thousand was enough."
Menachem Bader, a member of Hashomer Hatzair, had been sent to Constantinople by Ben Gurion a month earlier. After a month at his job, he visited Eretz Yisroel, where he addressed the Executive Committee of the Histadrut. "I have come to tell you that there are opportunities for rescue and aid... there is a ransom proposal in Slovakia... these schemes require vast amounts... are we free to ignore them and the possibility of realizing them? [Are we free] just because they are costly? Or just because it may mean risking the loss of tens of thousands of liras? How can we permit ourselves to think in such terms, when it is now clear that all of European Jewry is in mortal danger? And that too is on our account, for we were late in coming to their assistance. I have come to tell you that our hands are empty. The money which has hitherto been designated by the Histadrut and the Jewish Agency comes nowhere near the amounts which are necessary... [for helping] our brothers who are stumbling in their hopeless race against onrushing time and grim death." (M. Bader, Distressing Missions
Let us return to the meeting in February 1943, recalled by Dr. Eilam, where Haft complained of Gruenbaum's dismissal of Bader's recommendations. Kaplan, the Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, explained that the Keren Hayesod's funds were not to be touched. Golda Meyerson (Meir) tried to interest Ben Gurion and Kaplan in a money raising scheme that would have left Zionist funds intact. "There are a hundred Jews in Eretz Yisroel, who could be quietly summoned to a meeting and told, 'Each one of you must give a thousand liras now.' I have no doubt whatsoever that this would work. The question is, who will summon these Jews? If Ben Gurion and Kaplan would call them, it could be done very easily." (Barzel, quoting Beit Berl, Meetings of the Mapai Central Committee 1939-45)
Ben Gurion only articulated his views on the rescue issue some days later but even at this meeting, the difference between his attitude to wartime rescue and to aliya, was clearly apparent. When it came to raising money for important causes, he knew what to do. Addressing the topic of the rescue of children who would come to Eretz Yisroel he said, "Fifty thousand liras are needed for this... I think it is of the utmost importance that three men, one who represents the Agency Treasury (Kaplan) one who represents the Treasury of the Executive Committee (Remez) and one who represents the Conscription Tax or the National Council (Haft) should take it upon themselves to raise fifty thousand liras." (T. Frieling, Ben Gurion's Position Regarding The Rescue Of Children, Nov.'42-May '45, quoting from records in the Labor Party Archives)
The entrance to Auschwitz
A Turn Of The Screw
Back in Europe, a new deadline was approaching. Wisliceny was transferred from Slovakia and stationed in Greece. On the sixth of February 1943, he arrived in Salonica to begin the expulsion of the Jews to Auschwitz. (Fuchs)
The members of the Working Group naturally knew nothing of the events taking place inside the closed meetings in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Weissmandl was unaware of how quickly his father-in-law's advice that, "No trust whatsoever should be placed in Jewish heretics and haters of Torah," was being confirmed. He would only discover this after the War, whereas Gisi Fleischmann believed in her leaders in Eretz Yisroel up to the day she died in Auschwitz.
In the course of the Working Group's unceasing efforts to move ahead with The Europe Plan, Rav Weissmandl wrote about Wisliceny's trip to Greece, from where he was to return at the beginning of March. He requested authorization for offering Wisliceny a bribe in return for the cancellation of the deportation of the Greek and European Jews. "According to etiquette, we have no right to rouse you to awareness of the holy and fearful resposibility which you bear, however, we are closer to the troubles of these Jews than you are ba'h, and it is this proximity which allows us to bind you with every oath in our holy Torah and of ahavas Yisroel... [to] make every sacrifice that you can..."
Urging the Jewish leaders not to rely on calculations about how soon the War might be over, Rav Weissmandl wrote that matters should be concluded before the beginning of March, for with the approaching Spring, the Germans would plan to implement the deportation of the remaining Jews. (42) This letter was sent at the end of February.
At a meeting of the Mapai Central Committee on the twenty-fourth of February, Ben Gurion stated his views regarding rescue work. "Two questions are before us. First, those Jews whom we can get out of Europe—how are we to bring over and secondly, those Jews whom we cannot bring here—what is known as 'rescue.' As far as the second question is concerned, I don't know what money has to do with anything. I think that the second question doesn't exist at the moment. What does exist is the first question... if there are bands of pioneers remaining after the slaughter, they must be helped... [as for] bribery in order to prevent [evil] decrees, the Agency is unable to give money for that." (Yablonka from the Ben Gurion Archive, Kibbutz Sdeh Boker)
The leader of the yishuv and the most senior Zionist figure in Eretz Yisroel thus fully supported those who opposed extending financial assistance to European Jewry. Slaughter there may have been but all that interested Ben Gurion was the pioneers who might remain. Here is another researcher's conclusion.
"Ultimately, the general attitude was set in accordance with Kaplan's and Ben Gurion's comments. The Jewish Agency took upon itself all the financial and procedural arrangements for aliya, categorized as 'realistic programs' which allowed the 'extraction' of individuals, while it called for refraining from involvement in 'bribery.' The Mapai secretariat delineated the policy according to which the [movement's various] institutions would be urged to decide [their course.]" (N. Barzel)
Even Dinah Porat concedes, "The Rabbis' request in their first letters, that a representative of the Jewish Agency, the World Jewish Congress and the Joint, be appointed to negotiate with the S.S., was not acceded to."
The reactions of the leaders of the yishuv hitherto did not address The Europe Plan specifically (although its details had already reached Eretz Yisroel.) Nonetheless, their basically negative attitude towards providing monetary aid to save the remnant of European Jewry continued to determine their behavior in the ensuing weeks and months, even after The Europe Plan became more detailed and clearly defined.
March 1943
March arrived. "The letters from Slovakia from Mrs. Fleischmann and Rav Weissmandl continued to reach the Jewish organizations in March 1943. New reasons were for supporting The Europe Plan were added... each letter contained an entreaty for urgent help... as time went on, the letters, especially those of Rav Weissmandl, grew more begging yet more threatening and more critical at the same time." (D. Porat)
On the fifth of March, Rav Weissmandl wrote, "Regarding the general decree concerning the occupied lands, he [Wisliceny] has gone to the capital [Berlin] to speak with his superior once again. He holds out good hopes for his return in six weeks. I hope to see something definite from you so that we will no longer have to beat around the bush over this important matter."
"Copies of 'the Rabbis' letters' are found in Constantinople in March 1943, along with Nathan Schwalb's recommendation to the leadership in Eretz Yisroel, unequivocally demanding a response to the suggestion." (N. Barzel)
Here are some of the communications from that period. Writing to Eretz Yisroel on the second of March about the program, V. Pomerantz says, "There are points for and points against." (C.Z.A. quoted by D. Porat) Speaking for himself and for Kaplan on the fifth of March, Chaim Barlas asked Lichtheim and Silberschein to send their opinions of 'the Rabbis' program' by telegraph. (Yad Vashem Archive quoted by S. Bet Tzvi) In Bader's report to his superiors on the tenth of March, he mentions, "a possibility to save the Jews of Slovakia, Greece, Bulgaria and Holland with a thousand thousand Purmanskim [i.e. American dollars, so dubbed after the emissary of Hashomer Hatzair in the United States] paid in a ten percent down payment, followed by four installments." (Bader to Aberman, quoted by A. Horowitz)
A crushing response came from an influential quarter. On the tenth of March, Kaplan wrote from Constantinople to his Zionist colleagues in Slovakia. "My dear friends, I have read the rabbis' frightening letters calling and begging for help. To our dismay, we are unable to shoulder the entire burden. However, as I have already said, we do not view ourselves as being exempt from this concern and we will do whatever lies within our power. We have referred this appeal to the other segments of the Jewish People." (C.Z.A.) There you have it. The Treasurer of the Jewish Agency refers the appeal 'to the other segments of the Jewish People.' After his return to Eretz Yisroel, Kaplan told the leadership of the Jewish Agency, "There were some who placed their hopes in this Plan and promised to check it out and let us know." Dinah Porat comments, "Kaplan himself cast doubt on the success of 'sensational programs,' (as he called it.)"
Convincing The Skeptics
Apart from the basic unwillingness of the Zionist leaders to come to the aid of Diaspora Jews who were virtually all anti-Zionists, it was hard for them to reconcile themselves to the fact that the plan's instigators were rabbis. Lichtheim, the Agency's representative in Switzerland wrote to Barlas on the thirtieth of March, "Regarding the matter of the 'intervener' [Wisliceny] you know from my earlier correspondence that I have no faith in the words of rabbonim." (C.Z.A.)
This kind of attitude placed a further burden upon Rav Weissmandl. Besides all his own efforts to keep the channels of communication with the Germans open, he had to make sure that the alarm to the Jewish establishment was also distinctly sounded by people who did not bear the stigma of his own religious and political views.
Rav Weissmandl had not even been intended to discover this bias against him. He himself described how it happened. "Since all the diplomatic envoys operated through my friend Mo'h Binyomin Shlomo Stern n'y, in whose house I stayed all week... it happened that a messenger came with a large bundle of letters from Ankara... Because of something that once happened, I always used to open the letters, read them, reseal them and pass them on to their destinations. In that bundle, there was a letter... to Moshe Dachs, mentioning that they had received a letter from some 'fanatic'—their honorary title for a Jew who believed in Hashem and His Torah—which contained a proposal to save all the Jews from deportation. Since they weren't about to believe a fanatic, they were writing to their colleague Moshe Dachs, asking him to let them know if there was anything in the idea—only then would they believe it. I showed this letter to several trustworthy people so that they could later attest [to it's having been sent]. I resealed it and pretended I knew nothing about it.
I went to Neumann and Fleischmann however, and said that I was worried that perhaps, on account of hatred of religion, they did not believe my letters, since they were written in a rabbinical style, opened with boruch Hashem, the day and the weekly parsha and so on. I therefore wanted both they and Moshe Dachs to write, saying that everything was true. They wrote and signed the letter in front of me." (Min Hameitzar)
The letter to which Rav Weissmandl was apparently referring had been sent on the twelfth of March from Constantinople to members of the Zionist Movement in Slovakia. (ibid.) The reply, which was written and sealed in Rav Weissmandl's presence, contained the following request. "The members of the Zionist Movement in Slovakia ask the members of the delegation in Constantinople to give the Movement's seal of approval to the rabbis' proposal." (ibid. translated by Rav Weissmandl, document #22)
This reply, which was signed by Dachs, Neumann and Fleischmann, is dated the seventh of April 1943: "Bratislava, Our beloved colleagues, we have received your letter of the twelfth of March of this year and have read it to a committee of those who work for the Zionist organization... through your warm words, we discerned the call of Eretz Yisroel... and our faith is stronger than ever... that you, our friends in Eretz Yisroel, will not desert us in our terrible trouble... you know from the letters we have sent to Nathan, as well as from the notices sent by the rabbis... that there is a possibility of negotiating [for]... the cancellation of all the deportations... We are waiting for [Wisliceny] to come here in the second half of April, then we will continue the discussions... We understand from a certain passage in your letter that you apparently doubt the veracity of what was written in the rabbis' letter... let us therefore state our opinion, with all the responsibility which we carry, that both what the rabbis wrote, as well as what we write, is one hundred percent borne out by events, With our heartfelt wishes and Peace,
Moshe Dachs (E.Y. Ha'ovedet,) Gisi Fleischmann, Oskar Neumann (Zionist and Communal Organization)
Moshe Dachs wrote another letter on the fourteenth of March, "We have already written that the letter written by the rabbis is true." A comparison of the letter's handwriting and signature reveals that apparently, this letter was written by Rav Weissmandl and signed by Dachs. (Fuchs)
Na'ima Barzel writes, "It seems that the leaders' of the Slovakian Zionists confirmation of 'the Rabbis' letter' played a part in convincing the delegation from Eretz Yisroel in Constantinople. In their letter to Eretz Yisroel dated the twenty fifth of April, members of the delegation conveyed the message contained in the letter from Slovakia of the seventh of April almost word for word, adding their own assurance that "'the Rabbis' letters' contained not only their own views but those of all who are devoted to rescue work." In his letter to Kaplan, Barlas declared that 'Lichtheim was misled.' The proposal was reliable..."
End of Part 2
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