Opinion & Comment
The War That Was and the War That Wasn't
by Rabbi Nosson Zeev Grossman

One source for the American fear is Israel's coming elections, slated for May 17, 1999. Since Netanyahu is lagging in popularity polls these upcoming elections force him to try to regain political momentum. The American administration remembers well that Shimon Peres's government initiated the "Grapes of Wrath" campaign during the pre- election period of 1996. Washington also noted that after several Israeli cabinet meetings in the last few weeks dealing with Lebanon, the cabinet announced that Israel will attack targets in Lebanon if Israel is attacked.

During the last few weeks the U.S. has attempted to persuade Israel to refrain from increasing military clashes in Lebanon and has expressed its grave concern on at least four different occasions. Dennis Ross, the Peace Talks coordinator, raised the topic when he met with Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Foreign Minister, in New York. There were at least three separate contacts with Yitzchak Mordechai when he functioned as Defense Minister.

Indeed the Likud and its leaders have for many years suffered from the uncomplimentary label of always being on the warpath. A substantial part of this image has been systematically designed by their political rivals above and beyond the reality. The fact is that the precedent of signing a peace agreement with an Arab state was achieved through the Likud when Menachem Begin became prime minister about twenty years ago and not by a Leftist Labor government.

We, however, cannot ignore the fact that many Likud leaders have nationalist sentiments and militant aspirations that are likely to bring about an irresponsible decision to start a war and torpedo the peace process. It is well known that for this reason Maranan gedolei Yisroel always placed a firm condition before joining any coalition with the Likud that chareidi Knesset representatives have freedom to vote as they see fit on defense matters. This was done so that we will not be partners to rightist and nationalist policies that oppose da'as Torah in matters of pikuach nefesh -- preventing Jewish bloodshed.

Maran the Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Menachem Elazar Shach shlita, continuously warned against the fallacious views that rely on physical power and defying other nations. The Rosh Yeshiva stressed that we do prefer to be a part of the Rightist Likud government and not of a Leftist Labor government because, as far as religious and Jewish aspects, the Likud is the lesser of the two evils. That support should, however, not be regarded as championing the Rightist ideologies in areas of politics and defense that are far from da'as Torah.

There is therefore a definite basis for the American fear of a display of power in Lebanon by Netanyahu's government. Moreover, many acclaimed military figures have now joined politics (mostly on the Left). These are people with fighting in their blood, and for whom the bloodshed was once part of their daily life. This does not bode well. Many of these generals, and even those who constantly spout peace slogans (as proscribed by their professional American public relations advisors), are likely to change the moment they smell a battle. This has happened before.

The same week that America warned Israel not to launch any "show of force" Amir Oran, a reporter for Ha'aretz, published a spectacular scoop: Ehud Barak, the Labor Party candidate for prime minister had, right before the Lebanon campaign of 1982, prepared plans to expand that campaign into an all-out war against Syria.

Barak was at that time the head of the GHQ Planning Branch, the youngest general, and a favorite of Ariel Sharon, then Minister of Defense. Amir Oran writes: "An internal memorandum signed by Barak at the end of March 1982 and addressed to Sharon, later fell out of an army folder that was being sent to the archives. This memorandum reveals an alarming aspect of Barak's character: his readiness to join in a plot whose aim was not only to deceive the enemy but also Israeli citizens, soldiers, and the public's elected representatives.

"It seems that Barak wanted to provoke the political and military decision makers not to be satisfied with invading only Lebanon, but to launch a much more extensive war -- a war even against Syria. `It is possible that we are now in the midst of a unique historical situation,' Barak wrote Sharon. `The Syrians are isolated and their potential allies will join them, if at all, only at a significantly later stage.' "

He strived to make the higher IDF echelon realize their superior power over the Syrians. According to this proposed plan we should not be content with only attacking the missile batteries in the Jordan Valley. The army should even attack the missile batteries beyond the Syrian border and utilize the outcome to put the Air Force and Army into a massive action against the Syrian Army in Lebanon or the Golan Heights.

Amir Oran writes that with Barak's best creative talent he had skipped between the future and the past. "In retrospect, after the conclusion of the conflicts with the Syrians, the decisive element in reality would be our succeeding to defeat them in as short a time schedule as possible, with minimum losses, and without having to depend upon army reserves and American weapons immediately at the end of the fighting. The terrorists in Lebanon would be post facto a marginally important episode that had set into motion a much wider process.

"Swift IDF victories over the Syrians," Barak wrote, "would bring the Americans to quickly realize the new reality and to focus their efforts in a `post mortum' diplomacy against a Soviet client on the threshold of defeat."

Barak indicated foreseeable difficulties: "At the moment," Barak admitted, "there is no national consensus to act against the Syrians except under certain conditions when it concerns terrorists -- such as at times of a terrorist attack causing many loses or Katyusha rocket attacks on the Galil -- that in such an event we can reach a consensus."

He enumerated the many dangers: an Israeli attack against Syria is liable to cause the cessation of the war between Iraq and Iran, a transfer of Iraqi military power to strengthen the eastern front, and even to ending the fledgling peace process and returning Egypt to active hostility. These, he summarized, are "obscure dangers," that are insignificant when compared with the "sorrowful political and economical situation" facing Israel if it does not wage war. Such a war would also boost its prestige and influence "the way Israeli society evaluates itself, its self- confidence, and its entrenched positions."

Barak suggested preparing an "infrastructure for planning and operational concepts for a 1967-type surprise operation against Syria that would be built up by a rapid series of incidents." He wrote enthusiastically about the scenario that would occur: "A swift avalanche that would surprise both the Syrians and the Americans -- but not us -- and would deliver a general pounding of the Syrians." After the primary achievement they would "continue destroying the Syrian army with a very deep bypassing process through the Lebanon Valley, or by bursting in from the Southern Golan Heights if there is an opportunity as a result of shifting secret reserves toward the direction of Damascus or Lebanon."

This deception was intended to take care of several problems. As far as Washington was concerned, preliminary negotiations with the Americans would be delicate and extremely intricate but under no circumstance would we divulge our full intentions and their scope. To relieve internal criticism we would be "patiently waiting for the correct opportunity when there would be a maximum chance of reaching a broad agreement." With a four to six weeks warning, until the middle of May, Barak promised, "it is possible to work out a plan that would keep the whole framework, both the internal national and military one, in a fog about the intents and possibilities of its being put into effect."

The Ha'aretz reporter points out that for these decisive weeks the assiduous Barak prepared a detailed program for "a period of alertness," a "series of refresher operative plans," and "disguising the required changes by way of introducing them as plan refinements and updates." This must be done while creating a "camouflage" and "background noise" for the main plan.

Thanks to Hashem's mercy, the daring and warlike ideas of Ehud Barak, who strove to drive Israel into an all-out war with Syria, were not accepted. Such a war would have involved terrible bloodshed of young Jewish boys. If until now it is difficult to digest the pain and feelings of bereavement that the Lebanon War has left us, we are horrified when even attempting to describe what would have happened if that war had been extended to a military conflict with Syria, as Barak suggested.

The attempt to elevate the low Israeli morale and influence "the way Israeli society evaluates itself, its self- confidence, and its entrenched positions" was liable to exact a gruesome price, May Hashem protect us!

Maran HaRav Elazar Shach shlita, in a shmuess delivered in Ponovezh Yeshiva during the Shelom HaGalil Operation in 5742, spoke painfully about the rashness with which those who have cast off the Torah's yoke make life- threatening decisions. They act irresponsibly in connection with questions of life and death.

"Whether it was right or not, whether they needed to do it or not, is a legitimate question. There are so many casualties, and so many wounded as a result of it.

"In the outside world, the secular world, this is not taken into consideration at all. Lives are not precious to them. What is chiefly important to them is governmental positions, being in power, and running the country. Their personal glory is more precious to them than anything else. For the sake of such a disgusting sin as running after glory and power -- a sin one ought to be ashamed of -- they are ready to send Jews to their death. Where is their conscience? Do they think they were born this way, to power? What will happen to them when they lose their positions? Is it justified, in order to gain this power, to act so wickedly towards so many Jews?

"But what is there to ask about conscience and morality when they are bribed by their lust for glory? They are enveloped in personal interests and this bribery blinds them. Bribery applies not only to great issues -- even the smallest bribe is included. It is therefore even prohibited for a dayan to borrow a scythe from a litigant; that is already bribery."

Incidentally, at that time, when the mission in Lebanon seemed to be a "brilliant success," Maran shlita warned against being deluded. He cited what Rabbenu Nissim Gaon wrote (about the episode of the tanur shel achno'i in Bovo Metzia 49): "Sometimes a person is shown Heavenly `signs' that seem to lead to conclusions opposing the Torah way and halocho. This happens in order to test whether a person will remain firm in his opinion despite these signs."

Maran shlita afterwards mentioned several points that aroused doubts about the "gains" of long-range war. We must remember that Maran spoke when the entire Israeli public was applauding and praising the operation. Maran shlita, on the other hand, showed his deep concern about the future. Unfortunately, that is what materialized, and today with hindsight we see this as an example of how "a wise person is better than a prophet."

Maran shlita remarked that it is forbidden to examine reality with a superficial and transient view. First of all "it is not always worthwhile to be the victorious side of a battle. Victory has a high price -- Jewish lives.

"As for the entire business, success is not at all certain. It does not at all guarantee our existence. If today [the terrorists] are defeated, what will be in another year, in another five years? We have no guarantee for the future, and the present situation does not promise complete success, either. Today it is like this and tomorrow they are liable to, chas vesholom, become even stronger . . ."

He warned that there are decisions made in the Knesset categorically opposed to da'as Torah that show a lack of responsibility for the fate of the Jewish People all over the world.

"Was not the decision to start the war determined by a vote in the Knesset? That vote was entirely based upon deals among the MKs: you say this and I will say that, I will support you if you will do so and so -- as the gemora writes, `You watch for me and I will watch for you.' This is the way they reached the decision and obtained approval to launch a war! If the machinations had worked out differently, then the vote might have been different and another decision would have been reached. Can we rely on such decisions? Can personal considerations like these dictate the path of a whole people and decide life-threatening issues?

"Furthermore, those who are deciding these critical matters regarding pikuach nefesh must be mindful that Jews living in Eretz Yisroel are only one fourth of the world's Jewish population. All other Jews, a good three- quarters of the nation, are living in golus among the nations. This necessitates that every decision regarding Jews living in Eretz Yisroel ensure that World Jewry will not, chas vesholom, suffer because of what Jews in Eretz Yisroel do. We should be careful not to cause any antisemitism. Even if it seems that in the near future the hatred of the nations toward Jews living among them will not rise, we must take into consideration what might happen in the more distant future, in another five or ten years.

"Indeed, for someone who walks in the way of Torah such fateful decisions are made solemnly and with total seriousness, attentive to all sides and aspects of the matter at hand. According to the way of the Torah, in which we were educated, we must relate differently than others to such acts and be aware that not all that seems to be a `victory' is indeed so. [What they do] is neither da'as Torah nor the traditional way our ancestors have behaved throughout the years of golus.

"I am sure that some people will reject what I have said here and say: `This is a person with a golus attitude, someone who dances before the non-Jew because he is so afraid of him.' It is indeed true! We must be afraid of the non-Jews since we are still in golus! We must be responsible for all of Klal Yisroel wherever they are and not to, chas vesholom, cause anything detrimental to happen to them. May Hashem help us that no damage will happen and that we truly win over our enemies and be saved from any misery. We should, however, cholila, not overlook the real considerations when deciding about life-and-death questions, when we are about to execute weighty decisions like these."

As mentioned, we now see that the terrible entanglement and bloodshed of the Lebanon War was liable to be even worse if the reckless ideas of Ehud Barak had been adopted. The reminder that was lately publicized by the astounding document that Barak wrote in 5742 (1982) teaches us that there are no essential differences between the politicians and the retired generals brought up according to the Zionist ideology. They are all stricken with the lust of power and with militancy, causing them to make rash and irresponsible decisions because of unacceptable considerations of "national prestige" and "let us take our fate into our own hands."

The Right, the Left, and the brand-new Centrist Party are basically the same. The nationalist poison flows in all their veins. The pure da'as Torah that Maran the Rosh Yeshiva shlita expressed, according to our tradition for generations, is what guides us. We have nothing to do with such or any other type of nationalism.