Shinui in the coalition only because of his desire to effect
far-reaching changes, particularly in economics, and he was
well aware that the chareidi parties would not support these
moves. Whether or not this assessment is correct, at the
beginning of the term Shinui, for the first time in the
annals of the party, played a pivotal role in the government
with four ministers and one deputy prime minister, Knesset
committees and considerable influence on what took place in
the country.
Netanyahu made his economic moves under the patronage of the
Likud-Shinui-NRP axis. When his aggressive economic program
came to an end, Sharon no longer needed Shinui. The prime
minister was already looking forward to the upcoming
elections and knew he would get nowhere with Shinui. He had
taken them into his government by default in order to gain
two years of control without undue shakeups.
They enjoyed the pleasures of power for a year-and-a-half
until the summer of 5764 (2004) when coalition talks began
between the Likud and United Torah Jewry. Some of those
negotiation sessions were conducted between Likud
representatives and Degel HaTorah representatives alone,
leading to the impressive political maneuver of removing
Shinui from the coalition while presenting it to the media as
a party devoid of principles, a party driven only by a desire
for job handouts and seats in the government.
"During this period, Likud representatives contacted Shinui,"
recalls MK Rabbi Moshe Gafni, "and told them they were
conducting open negotiations with UTJ and that the chareidim
were placing very specific demands before the Likud. At the
end of one of the negotiating sessions at Kfar Maccabia [a
hotel in Ramat Gan] we reached an agreement for the total
preservation of the status quo [on religious issues] in the
country. I went out to the reporters and announced it. The
media was in a state of shock. `Which government portfolios
are you asking for?' they asked me and we told them we were
demanding the Interior and Justice [Ministries, which were
then occupied by Shinui ministers. The remark meant that
Gafni wanted Shinui out but it was clear that UTJ did not
expect or aspire to take over those ministries itself]. It
was clear we meant Shinui was on its way out."
Deputy Minister Rabbi Avrohom Ravitz: "In interviews with the
media and also during the negotiations with the Likud, I
proclaimed that we intended to become members of the
government through ministerial posts to induce them [Shinui]
to leave the government after they had declared they would
not sit together with us in the same government. I said that
even if Shinui members were to do teshuvoh it would
not be the same Shinui anymore, and of course they were in
shock."
Lapid found himself in a real bind. He had to respond to the
declarations made by Degel HaTorah representatives. On one
hand, he heard that the Likud had reached an agreement with
the chareidim on preserving the status quo, but on the other
hand he heard the announcement regarding UTJ's entry into the
government, which contradicted Shinui's stance, and he had to
decide whether the party should resign.
The Shinui Council convened a meeting where chaos reigned.
Lapid and Poraz defended themselves, claiming the party's
interests were more important than politics and that Shinui
must retain its seats in the government. They disgraced
themselves for all to see. Men of supposed principle revealed
themselves unwilling to give up their seats in the
government.
"Then we suddenly announced that if Shinui remains in the
government we would not join the coalition," says Rabbi
Gafni. "We became the men of principle. The Shinui Council
convened another meeting and decided not to resign from the
government. Meanwhile our negotiations with the Likud were
halted since we declared that we would not sit in a coalition
with Shinui. This was based on a directive from Maran HaRav
Eliashiv shlita. I held that since the talks had
reached a dead end there was no point in continuing to
conduct negotiations. But Maran shlita instructed us
to continue with the negotiations, even if there were no
immediate results."
Rabbi Ravitz: "That was their first crash. Shinui took all
the credit for leading the Likud, saying all along that
Shinui was the one leading the government from the inside,
and next time it would be the biggest party. Suddenly it was
revealed to be a party without principles, that seats in the
government were more important to them than anything else, at
a time when they had not succeeded in advancing many of their
bellicose proclamations."
The negotiations remained stuck in place until the budget
talks arrived just over a year-and-a-half ago. The Likud
began to conduct accelerated negotiations to gain UTJ's
support for the budget and Rabbi Gafni and Rabbi Litzman held
exhausting negotiations with Likud representatives, resulting
in an additional NIS 300 million ($65 million) for Torah and
education institutions. "The budget was brought before the
Knesset," recounts Rabbi Gafni, "but Shinui opposed it
because of the funding for the chareidim. The budget fell and
then Sharon sent letters of dismissal to the Shinui
ministers."
The shame was particularly caustic. Lapid, who had come
across for nearly two years as Ariel Sharon's closest
political ally, was suddenly forced to become the opposition
chairman. During this period, before the budget was rejected
and the Shinui ministers were fired, Ariel Sharon told Rabbi
Gafni that he was sure the budget would eventually pass and
the funding promised to the chareidim would be approved even
if Shinui voted against the budget.
"And if they vote in favor of the budget what will you do?"
Rabbi Gafni asked Sharon.
"Don't you worry," he replied, as if to say that if necessary
he would find a different pretext to boot them from the
coalition. In the end Sharon did rid himself of Shinui
because of the party's vote against the budget, marking the
beginning of the party's decline.
Just a few months earlier the Paritzky-Poraz scandal had been
exposed, casting Shinui as a party with corrupt figures in
its ranks. Today, according to recent opinion polls, the
party is on the verge of total collapse, not to mention the
astonishing vote in the Shinui Council two weeks ago in which
Poraz lost his number-two spot and Lapid narrowly retained
the party leadership. Lapid has since announced that he is
leaving Shinui and that it is not worthy of voters'
confidence.
*
Yated Ne'eman: Why did Sharon want to fire Shinui
members after working with them for two years?
Rabbi Gafni: Sharon came to the conclusion he could
not get anywhere with Shinui in the government. Their fall
began when Maran HaRav Eliashiv shlita instructed us
to continue the negotiations with the Likud, even after I
told him that there was no longer anything to negotiate. We
held the talks with the Likud in a manner that brought down
Shinui just as we had planned. There can be no mistaking or
ignoring the fact all this happened due to the negotiations
Degel HaTorah conducted with the Likud.
During the negotiations everyone was getting fed up with
them. We disgraced them through the negotiations. They were
disgraced in public opinion. They were disgraced within the
Shinui Council. The media mocked them for being
inconsistent.
From that time to the present we were in a state of Hashem
yilocheim lochem ve'atem tacharishun. Ever since then I
stopped responding to their attacks in the Knesset. Every
time one of the Shinui MKs issued an anti- chareidi call in
the Knesset I would dismiss it with a gesture and say out
loud, "You're no longer relevant."
YN: And where did the hundreds of thousands of Shinui
voters suddenly vanish to? Just three years ago they provided
the party 15 mandates.
Rabbi Ravitz: What they did to themselves is much more
significant. They caused the public to vomit them out. At
first the public was willing [to go along with them] to a
certain point in order to voice its hatred for the chareidim,
but they simply went overboard to the point where articles
could be found in the secular press, which is hardly suspect
of love for chareidim, griping about what Shinui did to them
with hatred towards Jews. Not just one article but things
that were said recently by prominent secular figures. Shinui
[supporters] began to see this a few months ago and they
tried to change the [party] line, but it was too late. They
no longer had enough time to play the hypocrites' game.
These are voters who despise chareidim but never imagined how
far the hatred could go. They had a single message—
hatred of chareidim—and this was translated in a very
clear manner, i.e. "yeshiva boys to the army," various laws,
the dismantlement of the Religious Affairs Ministry, etc.
Back then their voters hated us, but nobody among the voters
imagined where it would lead—to one of the great
tragedies of the Jewish people. This hatred by Shinui leaders
was not far from the Hitlerites' hatred toward the Jews.
However they gave this [hatred] a harsh expression that
Shinui was unable to implement in policies, and HaKodosh
Boruch Hu helped them to come crashing down before they
took other steps. But in terms of the depth of hatred, there
is no difference between them and regular antisemitic
hatred.
