No one knows how the idea of the disengagement plan
originated, but everyone knows how it did not originate. It
did not start with extensive brainstorming sessions and
discussions with senior defense officials or diplomats. It
did not come out of long consultations with politicians and
colleagues, in which the various alternatives were considered
and the likely long-term consequences were thought through
and evaluated. It certainly did not arise out of any sort of
organized decision-making process which enumerated the
various pluses and minuses, the likely gains and losses, the
various incidental aspects of the whole affair, its costs and
the way it could be carried out.
One reporter claims that Sharon made up the idea while the
reporter was interviewing him. His report of that interview
is the first published reference to the Disengagement Plan.
However even he is not sure if Sharon came to the interview
with the plan already in mind, or just threw out the idea in
the course of the conversation, as it occurred to him.
When it was first discussed, the plan was rejected by all the
defense establishment. Defense Minister Mofaz, who now
supports it, at first rejected it. IDF Chief of Staff Ya'alon
made several public statements about the dangers of a
unilateral withdrawal before he was silenced by the prime
minister.
As the idea gained ground, and as Sharon stuck to it, the
politicians and public figures began to support it, or at
least to toe the line in public.
The idea is a real break with the past. Israel has always
insisted on having a negotiating partner with whom to reach
an agreement. The first time the idea was ever seriously
raised was in the last election campaign when Amram Mitzna,
Sharon's opponent, suggested it. At the time no one took it
seriously; it seemed like a campaign maneuver but not a real
proposal. Nonetheless, a year later it is on its way to
becoming official policy.
The truth is that even in the months that it has been
debated, Sharon never explained what he saw as the reasons
for doing it, nor has he fully articulated his vision of
where he expects it to lead. He suffices with vague
abstractions. "The disengagement plan could bring about a
different reality," was what he said in opening the Knesset
debate about his plan this week.
Dov Weisglass, a lawyer who has been deeply involved in
government policy, said that the effect of the plan would be
to bring about a freeze in the situation that would put the
Road Map suggested by the international powers on ice.
However, he presented this as a likely consequence, rather
than as a goal of the plan. He did not articulate clear goals
either.
Experts, in particular the security experts, are divided
about the plan. Some say that it will improve security and
save lives; others say the opposite. The impression this
gives is that security considerations cannot decide and that
the experts are giving opinions based on their political
views and not based on their expertise.
What will happen if Hamas takes over Gaza? What will happen
if they start launching Kassams at Ashkelon, or even if they
continue to bombard Sderot? No one is going to guarantee that
this will not happen, least of all the Palestinian Authority
under Arafat.
The entire project appears to be tactics followed on the spur
of the moment. The instincts of the old general tell him that
it is important to seize the initiative and keep the other
side guessing and off balance.
Lev melech beyad Hashem, el kol asher yachpotz yatenu
(Mishlei 21:1). We have confidence in the overall Guide,
but, along with everyone else, we cannot see where we are
going.
