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13 Teves 5760 - December 22, 1999 | Mordecai Plaut, director Published Weekly
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Barak: Court Has the Right to Abrogate Law and Deal with Values

by E. Rauchberger

"Judges who have not been elected by the people can cancel laws of the elected legislature. This is a democratic act. In addition, the argument that the Court should not rule on values is unacceptable," said Chief Justice Aharon Barak in a lecture to the Israeli Association for Parliamentary Issues.

Barak spoke at length about the importance of the Basic Laws which are to constitute the Constitution of the State of Israel, and called for the completion of the Constitution as soon as possible, because it is currently incomplete --- or, as he put it -- "crippled and not very successful."

Barak was emphatic about the right and obligation of the Court to interpret laws.

"The need for judicial control of the legality of the law is evident. The supremacy of the Knesset and its special stature in the separation of powers does not empower it to function against the Basic Laws . . . The function of the Court in the separation of powers imposes upon it the necessity to interpret the Constitution and the laws."

In reply to a query whether it was democratic for judges who were not elected by the people to cancel laws of the elected legislature, Barak replied:

"The clear answer is: yes. Since the Constitution is a democratic document, judicial criticism, which is meant to enforce the Constitution, is democratic."

Alongside this, he stressed: "The Court has to display judicial restraint. It can cancel a parliamentary law only as a last resort . . . It must make every interpretive effort to arrive at a result in which the law and the constitution coincide. The cancellation of a law is a serious matter. However if, after all of this self-restraint has been applied, there is no choice but to cancel law, such activity must not be regarded as undemocratic. The opposite is true. This is democracy at its highest level. This is the formal and the essential rule of law at its highest level."

Barak attacked the concept of a "Court bypass law" and said that the Knesset can change a law as it sees fit, and disagree with the interpretation given it by the High Court, and this in no way undermines the Court.

However, what must be examined is whether the amendment is appropriate.

"If the interpretation does not seem correct to the Knesset, it has a right to amend the law," he said. Making an amendment is within the authority of the Knesset. When it does so, it doesn't undermine the authority of the Court. The Court interprets the law which a legislature has formulated. If the legislature doesn't agree with this interpretation, it has the right to legislate a new law. The legislature doesn't, thereby, assume judicial authority. Interpretation and legislating are two different things . . . Therefore the talk in Israel about a "Court bypass law" is irrelevant. The rhetoric about a "Court bypass law" should stop. We must focus on the content of the law: its legality and the question of appropriateness according to social and judicial parameters, he said.

Aharon Barak fervently defended the right and obligation of the Court to rule on values, and firmly rejected all criticism directed against him on this issue.

"Interpretation isn't a mechanical activity. It begins with the language of the Constitution and the laws, but is not confined to them. Every interpretation requires attention to values and principles."

He cited proofs from the wording of various laws to show that the Court must deal with values and ideologies, and that without doing so, it cannot make decisions according to the will of the legislature.

Barak also related to claims that judges issue decisions according to their own individual values and those of their social groups.

"In his judicial activity, the judge must not reflect his own subjective values. . . . He must behave objectively. The judge was not elected. He is permitted and obligated to deal with values which do not necessarily coincide with his own values, but rather reflect the values of the society in which he lives. The judge doesn't `represent.' He `reflects' and `expresses.' The Court, unlike the Knesset, is not a representative body. It is an nonpolitical, independent, objective body. Its power stems from its ability to clarify the values of the system as they arise in his judicial work."

Barak defended the procedure whereby judges serve in office until the age of 70 and need not undergo additional selection during their careers, unlike the political system, where representatives are elected every four years. "A politician is obligated to keep his constituents abreast of his activities and to conduct himself in accordance with the needs and wants of various sectors. As a result," he said, "professional judges, who are not elected, are best suited for the objective examination of values."

In concluding his remarks, Barak once more stressed the right and obligation of the Court to cancel laws which contradict the Basic Laws:

Barak surprised his audience by focusing on criticism leveled against the High Court.

"Criticism of the Court is vital. Who will guard the guard? Who will oversee us? We are prepared for criticism. We need criticism. But it must be presented in a restrained, relevant and respectable manner. Criticizing us is legitimate as long as the criticism is based on a knowledge of reality and the facts. We look forward to such criticism."

Barak then criticized those who say that it is impossible to criticize the High Court, and said that precisely the opposite is true, and that the Court is interested in criticism.

He then stressed that judges are human beings, and also fallible. "We also admit our errors," he said. He even suggested that if a High court were appointed above the current High Court, it is likely that it would overturn some 30% of the current High Court's rulings.


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